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I. Introduction 
U.S. corporations are increasingly holding greater amounts of cash and 
investments abroad. A recent statistic provided by the United States Senate Committee 
on Finance in November 2013 placed this figure at $4.5 trillion (Committee, 2013). 
This growing figure has received considerable scrutiny predominately attributable to the 
associated forgone tax revenue on unremitted earnings; however, the associated long-
term implications are a greater cause of concern than a one-time reduction in the United 
States’ deficit.1 This paper advances that increasing foreign investment is indicative of 
an international taxation system that systematically places U.S. multinational 
corporations at a competitive disadvantage compared to their foreign counterparts 
operating under a territorial system of taxation. 
The primary difference between the U.S. worldwide system and the territorial 
regime is the treatment of foreign income. Under territorial taxation foreign income is 
typically exempt from the home country’s tax. Whereas a worldwide tax system, like 
the one implemented in the U.S, attempts to tax foreign income at the home country tax 
rate while allowing tax credits for the amount of taxes paid in foreign jurisdictions. 
Each of the two international taxation systems has a sizeable amount of research 
devoted to outlining their respective economical advantages and disadvantages. This 
overarching debate is not the concern of this paper, but it focuses on a specific critique 
of the worldwide system of taxation.  
                                                        
1
 For tax purposes, it is important to consider that the entire $4.5 trillion of investments is not subject to 
the U.S. tax rate. To the extent that the investments are funded with reinvested earnings, repatriation of 
the investment is subject to the U.S. tax rate. Those investments financed through borrowed funds or 
capital investments of the U.S. parent corporation are not considered taxable by the U.S. government, but 
the income generated from these investments is taxable. The report by the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Finance did not specify these differentiated amounts. 
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The shortcomings of the United States’ worldwide taxation model have long 
formed the nucleus of a discourse lead by private sector leaders, yet their concerns have 
been historically discounted.
2
 The conclusions of CEOs and high-ranking executives 
like Tim Cook of Apple and David Cote of Honeywell lack serious recognition due to 
their inherent self-interests associated with a policy to reconstruct the United States’ 
corporate income tax. Furthermore, the perspective of executives turned tax critics are 
underpinned by generalizations. For example, the expertise of a CEO is limited to the 
boundaries of his or her respective enterprise and at most to the industry the company 
operates within. This paper seeks to provide an objective approach by applying an 
academic methodology to the claims of the private sector and address the question of 
whether the worldwide taxation system competitively disadvantages U.S. multinational 
corporations (MNCs) in comparison to the territorial basis of taxation.  
I analyze the competitive nature of the worldwide taxation system through two 
comparative case studies of the United Kingdom and Japan, who in 2009 converted 
from worldwide taxation systems to territorial taxation systems. I analyze indicators of 
competitiveness against measurements of the consequences of competitiveness for the 
years between 2006-2012 to determine if a significant change in competitiveness has 
taken place since their transitions in 2009. Including measurements of direct 
competitiveness and the consequences of competitiveness tests for both the causes and 
                                                        
2
 A Senate subcommittee hearing in April of 2013 accused Apple Inc. of tax evasion tactics in which its 
CEO, Tim Cook, responded with: “The tax system handicaps American corporations in relation to our 
foreign competitors who don’t have such constraints on the free flow of capital” 12/10/2014 2:38:00 PM. 
Additionally, Honeywell’s CEO, David Cote, was recently quoted in an interview stating, "We need to 
have a globally competitive tax system for our companies. If you put U.S. companies at a disadvantage 
when they're competing in emerging economies, we're making a huge mistake" 12/10/2014 2:38:00 PM.  
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the effects of the changes in overall competitiveness. The direct measures of 
competitiveness should theoretically be directly related to the consequences of 
competitiveness; therefore, an indication of increased direct competiveness should be 
accompanied by an increase in the consequences of competitiveness and vise versa. 
This dual analysis provides a two-test approach to ensure the accuracy of the paper’s 
findings. The direct measures of competitiveness include: corporate compliance costs, 
corporate tax revenues, average ROA, expenditure on corporate R&D, and the 
countries’ market efficiency rating from the Global Competitive Index. The indicators 
of the consequences of competitiveness include: the amount of dividends repatriated, 
the net inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI), the number of listed domestic 
companies, the listed companies’ market capitalization, and the unemployment rate. To 
determine if U.S. MNCs are competitively disadvantaged compared to Japanese and 
British MNCs, I use a difference of means approach to investigate whether a change in 
competitiveness after 2009 can be attributable to a transition to a territorial taxation 
system. Furthermore, the difference of means approach compares the changes in the 
competitiveness of American firms under worldwide taxation to the changes in 
competitiveness of British and Japanese firms during their transitions to territoriality.  
In addition to filling a research gap, the findings of this paper are applicable to 
the current legislative discussions taking place around overhauling the international tax 
codification. In November 2013, a proposal was set forth and deemed open for 
comment by the then Senator Baucus of Montana to the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Finance that recommended a divergence from current practices by requiring all foreign 
income to be taxed immediately or not at all (Committee, 2013). This would effectively 
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alter the United States’ worldwide taxation system to either tax foreign subsidiaries as if 
they were foreign branches or adopt elements of a territorial tax basis.
3
 Overhauling the 
United States’ international tax policies has garnered support from private and public 
sector leaders alike. As early as 2005, the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax 
Reform supported measures of territoriality followed by similar sentiments of the co-
chairs of the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (2005), the 
President’s Export Council (2010), the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology (2011), and finally in 2011 with members of the President’s Council on 
Jobs and Competitiveness (“Evolution of Territorial Tax Systems in the OECD,” 2013). 
The lack of headway on this issue suggests the need for additional research on the 
benefits of a territorial tax system. Furthermore, using the transition of Great Britain 
and Japan in 2009 from a worldwide to territorial tax basis as a proxy for the change 
one would expect to see in the United States would be the first of its kind to approach 
this problem through a case study analysis.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section II provides a brief overview of the 
principals of international taxation while developing the paper’s hypothesis. Section III 
places the paper within a body of existing research. The paper’s methodology is 
outlined in Section IV followed by Section V, which provides the results of the study. 
Finally, Section VI concludes the findings of the paper. 
                                                        
3
 The income of a business entity classified as a foreign branch is taxed currently. Unlike other 
classifications of foreign subsidiaries, foreign branches are not allowed to defer repatriation.  
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II. Background and Hypothesis 
Two Systems of International Taxation: Worldwide and Territorial 
Taxing foreign income adheres to two general principles. First, foreign income 
is taxed in the country in which it is earned. Second, each dollar of income is only taxed 
once. In a territorial system, foreign income is taxed once in accordance with the tax 
laws of the country in which the income was earned. For parents domiciled in a country 
with a territorial tax system, dividends received from a foreign subsidiary are not taxed 
by the parent’s home country. For example, assume a territorial parent domiciled in 
Canada owns subsidiaries in Ireland and Brazil and each subsidiary earns income in 
their respective countries. The income earned in Ireland is taxed at Ireland’s corporate 
tax rate (12.5%) and the income earned in Brazil is subjected to Brazil’s tax rate (25%). 
Thus, the Canadian government under a territorial taxation system will not tax the 
foreign income earned by either subsidiary (Scholes, Wolfson, Erickson, Maydew, & 
Shevlin, 2009).  
A worldwide system attempts essentially to tax all income of the multinational 
corporation (i.e. domestic income of the parent corporation and foreign income of the 
subsidiary) as if it were earned in the home country. Foreign income under a worldwide 
system is first taxed at the foreign tax rate and then as the income is transferred to the 
parent corporation, it is then subjected to the home country tax. Adhering to the two 
fundamental principles of taxation, double taxation is avoided by a system of foreign 
tax credits (FTCs). The amount of the FTC is equal to the foreign tax liability up to the 
U.S. tax liability. The FTCs then reduce the taxpayer’s home country tax liability 
dollar-for-dollar. Under worldwide taxation, a MNC pays taxes on foreign income in 
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two phases. The first phase is levied by the foreign jurisdiction at the foreign tax rate. 
The second phase of taxation is paid to the home country and due to FTCs is taxed at a 
rate equal to the difference between the home country’s tax rate and the foreign tax rate 
(Markle, 2011).  
Unlike traditional systems of worldwide taxation, the U.S. incorporates elements 
of deferral into its international regulations. With the exception of foreign branches and 
Subpart F income, paying the second phase of taxation to the home country can be 
deferred. The ability to defer the U.S. tax liability on foreign income attempts to 
compensate for the shortcomings of the American taxation system, namely its high tax 
rate and its worldwide basis. The process of transferring foreign earnings to the parent 
corporation is called repatriation. Repatriation typically takes the form of dividends, 
which become subject to the home country tax or the second phase of worldwide 
taxation. For example, assume a worldwide parent domiciled in the United States owns 
subsidiaries in Ireland and Brazil; each subsidiary earns income in their respective 
countries. The income earned in Ireland is first taxed at Ireland’s corporate tax rate 
(12.5%) and the income earned in Brazil is subject to Brazil’s tax rate (25%). Assume 
the parent corporation immediately repatriates the foreign income earned in Ireland to 
the United States. The foreign income earned in Ireland then becomes taxable by the 
United States at a rate of 40%. Double taxation is averted by reducing the U.S, tax 
liability (taxed at 40%) by the foreign tax liability (taxed at 12.5%). Therefore, the U.S. 
tax liability is equal to taxing the Irish income at the rate equal to the difference 
between the U.S. tax rate (40%) and the Irish tax rate (12.5%). The earnings of the 
Brazilian subsidiary are considered deferred until the parent corporation elects to 
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repatriate the foreign income to the United States, at which point it would be subject to 
the U.S. tax rate. 
Consider two identical multinational corporations, T and W, where T is 
domiciled in a territorial country and W is domiciled in a worldwide country. T’s tax 
rate is tt and W’s tax rate is tw. Both multinationals own a subsidiary in a country with a 
corporate tax rate equal to tf and they each earn foreign income equal to I. T’s foreign 
income taxes on I would be I*tf. Initially, W would pay foreign taxes to the foreign 
government equal to I*tf  thus resulting in net after-tax income of In=I-(I*tf ). If W 
forgoes reinvesting their foreign earnings, then In is repatriated to the parent and I, the 
pre-tax foreign income, is subject to tw. In this scenario, W’s full tax bill is equal to 
(I*rw)-(I*rf ).
4
 
Territorial taxation is currently considered the global norm. The United States is 
among the minority of nations with a worldwide system. The U.S. is the only G-8 
country operating under a worldwide system and of the 34 member nations of the 
OECD, 28 implement a territorial system (“Evolution of Territorial Tax Systems in the 
OECD,” 2013). Before 2009, the U.S. was flanked by the United Kingdom and Japan as 
the guardians of worldwide taxation; however, both countries in 2009 converted to a 
territorial system. After Japan’s “economic vitalization,” Mieko Nakabayashi, a former 
member of Japan’s House of Representatives, made the astute comment, “With most of 
the world—Japan included—cutting corporate tax rates and employing territorial tax 
systems to remain competitive, the U.S. must surely know that its hesitancy to do these 
things is handing the advantage to its international competitors. They will suffer from 
the hesitancy while we and others outside the U.S. will benefit” (Galvin, 2013). Their 
                                                        
4
 Where I*rf  is equal to the tax credit that reduces dollar-for-dollar W’s tax liability. 
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recent transition provides a pertinent case study to compare to the United States’ 
situation. The swiftness of their transition provides a stark line of differentiation 
between the two taxation systems. Other recent transitions within the European Union 
are less relevant for the purposes of a case study due to the fact that these countries 
progressively adopted elements of territoriality by “build[ing] foreign dividend 
exemptions into bilateral tax treaties and subsequently adopt[ing] broad exemptions 
either for affiliates within the EU or all foreign affiliates” (Dittmer, 2012).  
International Tax Structures’ Effect on a Firm’s Competitiveness 
The common downfall of critics of worldwide taxation is failing to articulate the 
link between a corporation’s competitiveness and their tax bill. The link consists of 
differing tax rates, value-added processing, trapped cash, and reduced tax revenue. The 
U.S. currently taxes domestic and foreign income at the highest corporate tax rate of 
40%. This figure is significant when compared to countries such as Bermuda that has a 
corporate tax rate of 0% or the average rate of members of the OECD (25.32%) 
(“Corporate tax rates table,” 2011). The discrepancy in rates constitutes the difference 
of over billions of dollars in annual taxes. Decreasing after-tax profit margins hinders 
U.S. MNCs’ ability to offer competitive prices in the global marketplace. Furthermore, 
the large size and dramatic growth of cross-border capital flows highlights the impact 
taxes have on a corporation’s competitiveness. Michael S. Knoll quantifies this 
assertion in Business Taxes and International Competitiveness: “In 1960, annual cross-
border investment flows represented 1 percent of GDP. In 2006, it was 18 percent of 
GDP. By 2006, the aggregate ownership of foreign capital by U.S. investors and of U.S. 
capital by foreign investors totaled $26 trillion – about two years’ GDP” (Knoll, 2008). 
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For this reason, tax planning is a fundamental element to business strategy and 63% of 
CEOs consider “the competitiveness of the tax regime when deciding where to operate” 
(Stamm, Weeghel, & Monfries, 2014).   
The complexity of the worldwide codification discourages focusing on value-
added processes. To cope with this disadvantage, U.S. domiciled corporations engage in 
aggressive tax avoidance as a mechanism to remain competitive. Hence, the low 
effective tax rates (ETR) of businesses such as Apple Inc. with an average ETR of 14% 
between 2007-2012 (Bostock, Ericson, Leonhardt, & Marsh, 2013). However for tax 
avoidance to be lucrative, a substantial amount of time and resources must be devoted 
to compliance—tax preparation expenses, labor, and administrative costs. Allocating 
resources to compliance appropriates resources from value-added processes that further 
the core competencies of the business. Therefore, operating under an unfavorable tax 
system such as the worldwide model stifles U.S. corporations’ innovation. It is believed 
that decreased relative innovation severely inhibits the long-term competitiveness of 
U.S. MNCs.  
The current U.S. system of worldwide taxation with deferral encourages MNCs 
to defer the tax liability associated with foreign-earned income by reinvesting foreign 
earnings abroad rather than engage in repatriation. The product of foregone repatriations 
is trapped cash (Hartzell, Titman, & Twite, 2005). Trapped cash contributes to the 
systematic handicapping of U.S. MNCs in comparison to their territorial competitors. 
Trapped cash presents three viable investment strategies: expand operational assets, 
seek returns from financial assets, or repatriate to the parent corporation (Sansing & De 
Waegenaere, 2006). To avoid incurring high repatriation taxes, foreign financial assets 
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are used to reach a favorable cash position; however, foreign investments pose the 
danger of becoming inefficient market solutions. Foreign acquisitions are an example of 
an inefficient investment decision because “U.S. MNCs that have high levels of cash 
trapped overseas in the form of both PRE [permanently reinvested earnings] and cash 
holdings…make less profitable cash acquisitions of foreign target firms than U.S. 
MNCs without trapped cash” (Edwards, Kravet, & Wilson, 2012). Foreign acquisitions 
tend to be overpriced, possess a lower average ROI, and can be the result of empire-
building techniques. Edwards, Kravet, and Wilson warn of the possibility that foreign 
acquisitions paid in cash can have a negative net present value (NPV) due to rising 
agency costs. Worldwide taxation necessitates U.S. MNCs to adopt tax-motivated 
behavior that misappropriates foreign capital in suboptimal investments, thus 
competitively disadvantaging U.S. MNCs.  
In addition to the inefficient investment of capital, trapped cash negatively 
impacts the national economy through the loss of U.S. jobs and tax revenue, which 
indirectly hampers the competitiveness of U.S. MNCs. Initially, these side effects seem 
to be the sole concern of the public sector, yet the public and private sector are closely 
intertwined around supporting American business. The projected deferred taxable 
income associated with trapped cash is approximately two trillion dollars (Welch & 
Baigorri, 2014). Although this sum would support public initiatives in addition to 
business policies, this translates into underfunded governmental agencies which oversee 
the legal protections of patent and intellectual property, ensure trade and monetary 
freedoms, promote technological innovations, and uphold labor standards. These are the 
qualities that foster and attract business to the United States. If the short-term effects of 
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these short falls are not causes of concern for U.S. MNCs, the long-term implications 
are detrimental considering cash abroad is projected to increase thus exacerbating 
budgetary gaps. In the end, these factors will impede U.S. MNCs ability to successfully 
conduct business thus negatively impacting future performance and earnings. 
If the worldwide system seems to favor neither private nor public interest, why 
does the United States continue to operate under a worldwide basis? There is a sizable 
body of literature devoted to the debate advancing the merits and uncovering the faults 
of each system of international taxation, however this issue falls outside the scope of 
this paper. Proponents of the worldwide regime critique territoriality for incentivizing 
incorporation abroad and reducing tax revenue through a decreased tax basis.
5
 Adoption 
of territoriality has been largely avoided due to the transition’s complexity. Overhauling 
the American tax regulations requires significant investments in capital, time, and trial. 
America’s lingering hesitancy to embrace elements of a territorial system highlights the 
importance of studying the transitions of the United Kingdom and Japan to territoriality. 
This paper seeks to further the research of the competitive benefits of transitioning to 
territorial taxation and the consequences of competitiveness.   
Hypothesis 
 Based on the above discussion, I expect the competitiveness of British and 
Japanese firms to increase after they adopt a territorial tax regime. I further expect that 
this increase in competitiveness is greater than the change in competitiveness for U.S. 
firms over the same period. I measure competitiveness with ten variables that can be 
categorized into two baskets: 1) direct measures of competitiveness and 2) the 
                                                        
5
 See Maffini (2012) and Altshuler and Grubert (2002) 
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consequences of competitiveness. Each basket contains five variables. The ten measures 
of competitiveness studied are listed, categorically, below with a rationale for the 
inclusion of the variables in the model and the individual results I expect each variable 
to produce within the context of the study:  
1. Direct Measures of Competitiveness 
a. Corporate compliance costs – Corporate compliance costs are measured in 
the unit of time, specifically the average hours demanded of a MNC to 
comply with a nation’s tax regulations. This variable is denoted in tables as 
“Corporate Compliance Costs.” Compliance costs directly correlate to a tax 
system’s complexity; the higher the cost, the more complex a tax system is 
considered. Corporate compliance costs measure a form of competitiveness 
based on value-added processing. A complex taxation system with a high 
cost to comply motivates MNCs to rely on a competitiveness that depends 
upon the amount of money it can save on taxes instead of a competitiveness 
based on sustainable marginal productivity through value-added processes. 
With the chief aim of increasing the global competitiveness of its MNCs, I 
expect both British and Japanese compliance costs to decrease following 
their transitions to territoriality because exempting foreign income from 
taxes would result in compliance simplification. Further, as the United States 
continues to tax foreign income under its worldwide base, I expect the 
British and Japanese compliance costs to decrease in relation to the U.S. 
b. Corporate tax burden – The corporate tax burden is expressed as a 
percentage of each country’s G.D.P, which is uniformly calculated in 
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American dollars. The total corporate tax burden is imposed by a national 
government and is equal to the total tax revenue collected. Thus, the study 
refers to the corporate tax burden as “Corporate Tax Revenue.” The 
corporate tax revenue variable captures competitiveness through 
profitability. For a corporation to be more competitive than its competitors it 
must achieve a greater profitability. Profitability decreases for each dollar of 
taxes paid. Considering lower marginal tax rates are more strongly 
correlated to territorial tax regimes in relation to worldwide taxation, I 
predict a greater decrease in the corporate tax revenue variable for the U.K. 
and Japan after their transitions to territorial tax regimes in comparison to 
the change experienced in the U.S. (Maffini, 2010) . 
c. Return on Assets (ROA) – This indicator of direct competitiveness is 
expressed as “ROA.” ROA is a comprehensive measure of profitability. The 
previous variable, corporate tax revenue, more closely ties profitability to 
taxation, but the advantage of including ROA is that it more accurately 
captures the overall performance of a corporation.
6
 I expect the decreased 
tax liability associated with territoriality to result in a greater increase in 
profitability, measured with the variable of ROA, for the U.K. and Japan. I 
expect the increased profitability of the U.K. and Japan to predominate any 
increased profitability that U.S. could experience from continuing with a 
worldwide tax regime.  
                                                        
6
 The ROA was calculated by averaging the ROAs of the top 50 companies in each respective country on 
the Forbes Global 2000 List.  
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d. Corporate R&D expenditures – This statistic aggregates the amount of R&D 
expenditures reported on the income statements of the publically traded 
corporations domiciled in a particular country. The variable is titled in tables 
as “Corporate R&D Expenditure.” Corporate R&D expenditure captures a 
long-term form of competitiveness—innovation. Without continual 
innovation a sustainable competitive advantage cannot be maintained. James 
R. Hines Jr. in No Place Like Home: Tax Incentive and the Location of R&D 
by American Multinationals concludes, “R&D tax incentives are important 
to maintaining the U.S. competitive position in world markets” (Hines Jr., 
1994). Thus, increased corporate R&D expenditures relates to increased 
competitiveness. Although I do not expect to find a sharp increase in 
corporate R&D expenditures in the U.K. and Japan following their 
transitions to territoriality, I do expect increased profitability to then be 
allocated or reinvested into additional R&D over time. I expect the changes 
in corporate R&D expenditure for the U.K. and Japan to be greater in 
comparison to the change of MNCs in the U.S. 
e. Market efficiency rating - This variable is referred to as the “Market 
Efficiency Rating” in the paper’s tables. The market efficiency rating is one 
of several components or “pillars” of the Global Competitive Index (GCI) 
conducted by the World Economic Forum. The GCI is a comprehensive 
statistic that takes into account macroeconomic, societal issues, and social 
factors when measuring competitiveness. However, the market efficiency 
rating hones in on the factors that are specific to private business enterprise. 
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Specifically, the market efficiency rating captures each country’s market 
share—an important measure of competitiveness. The market efficiency 
rating measures both domestic and foreign market share.
7
 Market share 
captures an important aspect of competitiveness because it is a metric to 
judge one’s performance against competitors. A greater market share 
corresponds to a corporation’s superior performance in relation to its 
competitors. Although I do not expect a significant increase in market share 
for the U.K. and Japan following their transitions to territorial tax regimes, I 
do expect the market efficiency variable to experience a greater increase 
following transition in Britain and Japan compared to the U.S. due to the fact 
that I expect their territorial transitions to results in greater overall 
competitiveness. 
2. Consequences of Competitiveness 
a. Total amount of dividends repatriated – This variable, referred in the tables 
as “Dividends Repatriated,” is calculated by adopting the design of 
Alexander Lehmann and Ashoka Mody, co-authors of the paper titled, 
International Dividend Repatriations, who faced a situation in which: "Only 
total FDI income and its component reinvested earnings were available. As 
the income on intra-company debt is normally very small (less than 2 
percent of total income), dividends have been approximated as the residual 
between income and reinvestment” (Lehmann & Mody, 2004). It is assumed 
                                                        
7
 Domestic market share is the sum of gross domestic product plus value of imports of goods and 
services, minus value of exports of goods and services. Foreign market share is equal to the value of a 
nation’s exports of goods and services. Market share is included within the market efficiency rating 
instead of as a standalone variable due to the difficulty in measuring market share and finding the 
corresponding data.  
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that the proportion of overseas affiliates’ net income that is not repatriated is 
reinvested earnings. Reinvested earnings abroad results in trapped cash. As 
previously mentioned, trapped cash decreases competitiveness through 
inefficient allocations of resources. The more competitive a corporation, the 
less trapped cash they possess which translates to a greater amount of 
dividends repatriated. Thus, the amount of dividends repatriated is a 
consequence of competitiveness. As I predict the British and Japanese firms’ 
competitiveness to increase following transition and for this increase to be 
greater than the change in U.S. firms’ competitiveness, I thus expect a 
similar result with the variable measuring total dividend repatriations.  
b.  Foreign direct investment – Foreign direct investment, referred to as “FDI,” 
is expressed as net of inflows. The FDI indicator is categorized as a 
consequence of competitiveness due to the fact that this amount is directly 
tied to the overall competitiveness of a nation’s economy. For example, the 
net inflows of FDI increase with favorable investment opportunities, a 
supportive economic environment, and a more competitive market situation. 
I expect the data to return a positive change in FDI for the U.K. and Japan 
following their transitions to territoriality and for the positive change to be 
greater than the change experienced in the U.S. for the same time period. 
c. Number of listed domestic companies – This variable, referred to as 
“Domiciled Corporations,” measures the number of publically traded 
companies domiciled in a nation. Investment companies, mutual funds, and 
other collective investment vehicles are not included in this statistic. This 
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indicator of the consequences of competitiveness tests for corporate 
inversions.
8
 Inversions are a product of an unfavorable business 
environment; consequently corporations employ inversion tactics to remain 
competitive and to seek greater returns abroad. Inversions are a prevalent 
form of tax avoidance in all developed nations including the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and Japan. The number of nationally domiciled 
corporations is indicative of a more competitive market for business. As 
such, I expect a greater increase in the number of domiciled corporations in 
the U.K. and Japan after they transitioned to a territorial tax regime. 
Furthermore, I expect this increase to be greater than the change in the 
number of domiciled corporations in the U.S. for this same time period. 
d. Market Capitalization – The variable titled, “Market Capitalization,” 
quantifies the dollar value of all listed companies’ outstanding stock in a 
particular country. Like the domiciled corporations variable, this statistic 
does not account for the market capitalization of investment companies, 
mutual funds, and other collective investment vehicles. Market capitalization 
captures the worth or future profitability of a corporation. If, for example, a 
favorable tax policy were passed that increases the competitiveness of 
MNCs then one would expect the corporations’ aggregate profitability to 
increase thus reflecting in a positive or increased market capitalization. This 
is exactly the chain of events I predict to occur as a result of Britain and 
Japan adopting a territorial tax regime. Additionally, I expect the increased 
                                                        
8
 A corporate inversion is transplanting the home corporation from a high-tax nation to a low-tax nation. 
An inversion changes the country in which a business is domiciled and incorporated. 
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market capitalization in the U.K. and Japan, ascribable to their transitions to 
territoriality, to outweigh the change in market capitalization realized in the 
U.S. for the same time period. 
e. Unemployment – This variable is represented in tables as the 
“Unemployment Rate.” The unemployment rate is inversely related to a 
favorable consequence of competitiveness. For example, as repatriations 
increase and capital is more readily accessible to corporations their 
investments increase in effectiveness but also in scope. Corporate expansion 
demands additional labor and thus the unemployment rate would decrease as 
competitiveness increases. I expect the variable of unemployment to move in 
conjunction with the other indicators of the consequences of competitiveness 
and in particular the variable of dividends repatriated, which is to increase 
following the British and Japanese transitions to territoriality and for this 
increase to be greater than the change in U.S. firms’ competitiveness 
The difference of means statistically analyzes the varying degrees of 
competitiveness and compares the means of each measure of competitiveness for the 
United Kingdom and Japan (represented with µ1) before and after their 2009 transitions. 
The difference in means statistic measuring the effect of adopting a territorial taxation 
system is compared to a similar statistic for the United States (µ2). Britain and Japan 
will have successfully increased their firms’ overall competitiveness if the difference 
between the average in the period before transition (µ1 before) and the period after 
transition (µ1 after) is greater than the difference witnessed in the United States (µ2). The 
thesis restated in statistical terms is thus: 
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 Alternative: µ1 after - µ1 before ≥ µ2 after - µ2 before
*
 
To ensure accurate conclusions can be deduced, a two-test approach is 
implemented. In addition to testing the direct measures of competitiveness (compliance 
costs, corporate tax burdens, ROA, expenditures on corporate R&D, and the market 
efficiency rating), the research model includes indicators that measure the consequences 
of competitiveness. These indicators include: amount of dividends repatriated, amount 
of FDI, number of listed domestic companies, market capitalization, and unemployment 
rate. With this approach, one would expect to witness the mirroring effect insofar that 
the data would demonstrate increased competitiveness in terms of direct measurements 
and its consequences. Ultimately, the expectation is that these measurements will 
illustrate that firms are more competitive operating under a territorial tax system 
compared to a worldwide tax regime. If the hypothesis proves to be correct, then this 
research would provide evidence for the United States to adopt a territorial system of 
international taxation to preserve U.S. MNCs’ competitiveness. 
                                                        
*
 For measures that represent a competitive disadvantage (e.g. corporate tax revenue and corporate 
compliance costs), one expects the inverse to be true. In that case, the null hypothesis is equal to: µ1 after - 
µ1 before ≤ µ2 after - µ2 before. 
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III. Literature Review 
Comparing the advantages and disadvantages of the worldwide system against 
those associated with territoriality is not a novel research concept. Mihir A. Desai, C. 
Fritz Foley, and James R. Hines Jr. are considered experts on questions of the differing 
tax bases. Much of their research has provided concrete evidence supporting a transition 
to territoriality. For example, in Repatriation Taxes and Dividend Distortions they 
conclude that one effect of an American transition to territoriality would result in a 
12.8% aggregate increase of dividend repatriations to parent corporations domiciled in 
the U.S. (Desai, Foley, & Hines Jr., 2001). Similar to their colleagues, Desai et al. fail 
to answer the long-term question of MNCs’ competitiveness.  
Kevin Markle provides a counterpoint to the research of Desai et al. by 
demonstrating that territorial subsidiaries shift more income than worldwide 
subsidiaries (Markle, 2011). Income shifting is closely associated with tax avoidance 
thus outlining a superior tax base for a worldwide system. Markle investigates which 
system more effectively raises tax revenue, but he provides the inspiration for my work. 
As he analyzes the implications for further research from his findings in A Comparison 
of the Tax-motivated Income Shifting of Multinationals in Territorial and Worldwide 
Countries, he writes: “Because Japan and the UK changed from worldwide to territorial 
systems in 2009, the possibility may exist to test for differences in the shifting of their 
multinationals before and after the change in an event study framework. Unfortunately, 
useful data for such a study are not yet available…As such, it is expected that the 
behavioral responses of firms will be delayed until there is a stronger sense that the 
transitions are complete” (Markle, 2011). The useful data he refers to is now available, 
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five years following the transition. My thesis applies Markle’s methodology and 
Michael Knoll’s rudimental research that identifies the relationship between corporate 
income taxes and global competitiveness in The Corporate Income Tax and the 
Competitiveness of U.S. Industries. 
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IV. Methodology 
The paper is a comparative case study analysis that investigates whether U.S. 
MNCs are systematically disadvantaged due to the worldwide system of international 
taxation. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan constitute the entire case 
study. In 2009, the United Kingdom and Japan both underwent a transition from a 
worldwide tax basis to a territorial tax regime. Statistical analysis in the form of the 
difference of means compares tests of overall competitiveness in the three years prior to 
and following the 2009 transition. These figures then are matched against similar 
measurements for the United States. This dual comparison provides evidence to 
determine whether the transitions to territoriality increased the competitive position of 
British and Japanese MNCs while investigating whether U.S. MNCs’ are competitively 
disadvantaged compared to their territorial counterparts. 
The variables that test for competitive significance are based on the motivations 
of the United Kingdom and Japan to adopt a territorial tax system. Although their 
principal rationale for the transition is very similar, they each sought to change differing 
marks of competitiveness. In the years leading up to 2009, the United Kingdom 
witnessed an exodus of corporations through inversion transactions. Her Majesty’s 
Treasury in 2007 outlined that their primary objective through the transition was to 
“improve the competitiveness and attractiveness of the U.K. as a location for 
multinational business” (Taxation of companies’ foreign profits: discussion document, 
2007). Furthermore, they specifically identified the need to address rising compliance 
costs. In Section 3, Subsection 4 it reads: “Multinational/large business has told the 
Government that the inherent complexity of their group structures means that the 
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application of the current credit regime to them is administratively complex” (Taxation 
of companies’ foreign profits: discussion document, 2007). Therefore, two dependent 
variables of competitiveness are the number of domiciled corporations and the amount 
of compliance costs (measured in time).  
Japan’s transition to territoriality reveals three additional measurements of 
competitiveness. Although the United Kingdom’s concerns were also the concerns of 
the Japanese, Japan was largely driven by macroeconomic issues. Before 2009, Japan 
retained the highest corporate tax rate, which was only 0.69% higher than the United 
States’ (“Corporate tax rates table,” 2011). Due to their high corporate tax rate, Japan 
was experiencing the lockout effect.
9
 The Japanese government responded in 2008 to 
vouch to “improve the circumstances to contribute to the flow into Japan of the profits 
acquired by Japanese enterprises in the overseas markets by utilizing their strength in 
order to prevent the profits from being kept overseas excessively and not to let the 
research and development and employment, etc. in Japan forming the source of 
competitiveness flow out overseas” (Miyatake, 2009).  
The corporate tax burden, R&D expenditures, and unemployment rate are three 
pertinent variables that can be extracted from Japan’s motivation to shift to territoriality. 
The corporate tax burden is an important direct measure of competitiveness because at 
its most basic the annual tax bill is a significant expenditure. Although this indicator is a 
proxy for each of the country’s corporate tax rates, it more precisely captures the 
effective tax rate and collections. In accordance with Maffini’s findings, one would 
                                                        
9
 The lockout effect is the ability to defer paying home country taxes on some foreign earned income until 
such earnings are repatriated. Deferral creates a disincentive for MNC to repatriate foreign earnings from 
a low-tax jurisdiction to a high-tax home country. Furthermore, tax planning through income shifting 
allows MNCs to shift foreign earnings from high-tax foreign jurisdictions to low-tax foreign jurisdictions, 
thus exacerbating the lockout effect. 
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expect the average corporate tax burden to be lower for the United Kingdom and Japan 
due to their adoptions of territorial taxation.
10
 R&D expenditures are an additional 
measure of long-term competitiveness. Government officials largely incentivize 
domestic R&D through favorable tax treatment to spur innovation and create jobs. The 
interdependent relationship between taxes and R&D is best described by Bailey and 
Lawrence in their 1992 study titled, Tax Incentives for R&D: What Do the Data Tell 
Us?, in which they report that the elasticity of R&D spending with respect to its after-
tax cost is approximately one (Bailey & Lawrence, 1992). Lastly, the unemployment 
rate is inversely related to the competitiveness of a nation’s firms. As trapped cash 
increases and inversions become more frequent the demand for labor decreases and thus 
the unemployment rate increases. Due to the fact that the United Kingdom and Japan 
sought to specifically target reducing corporate inversions and prevent losing jobs to 
overseas markets, I expect a larger decrease in unemployment in the U.K. and Japan 
following their transitions to territoriality than the change experienced in the U.S. 
during the same time period. 
Additional variables that were incorporated in the model include: ROA, market 
efficiency rating, amount of dividends repatriated, amount of FDI, and the market 
capitalization of listed companies. In total, ten variables were investigated for each of 
the three countries across the seven years (2006-2012); five of which were direct 
measurements of competitiveness and five measured the consequences of 
competitiveness. Both direct measures of competitiveness and the consequences of 
competitiveness are studied for two reasons. Firstly, this approach ensures accurate 
                                                        
10
 Maffini (2012) successfully correlates a lower marginal effective tax rate (METR) to territorial regimes 
compared to worldwide systems. 
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conclusions because it acts as a two-test design. One would expect to witness a 
mirroring between both the variables that measure competitiveness and its 
consequences. For example, as measures of direct competitiveness increase then one 
expects a proportional favorable increase in the consequences of competitiveness. The 
two-test design provides the advantage of deducing whether a system-wide change in 
competitiveness occurred as the result of differing tax regimes. Secondly, studying both 
competitiveness and its consequences provides additional information on the casual 
relationship between economic metrics, competitiveness, and varying tax policies.  
To ensure comparability across the three countries, the variables are deflated by 
each nation’s GDP. Corporate compliance costs are deflated by each nation’s total 
assets to allow for greater comparability across the three countries. Unemployment rate, 
average ROA, and the market efficiency rating were not deflated by GDP due to the fact 
that these variables are already expressed as a ratio. Sensitivity analysis is also 
conducted on the data to control for the effect that the 2009 Financial Crisis could have 
on the data. Sensitivity analysis is conducted by omitting the data pertaining to 2009 for 
all variables. While ensuring the crisis is not accountable for the entire regime change 
for the period prior to the 2009 transition, this also controls for the year of the 
conversion in which the U.K. and Japan were partially operating under both a 
worldwide and territorial system of taxation. Furthermore, this simplification provides 
three data points on either side of the transition for analysis. 
The data for the empirical model comes from a variety of sources. These sources 
include: the World Bank, the OECD, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Mergent 
Online, PwC Paying Taxes Reports, the World Economic Forum’s Global 
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Competitiveness Reports, the British Office of National Statistics, and the Japanese 
Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry. 
Statistical Models 
Three models are used to analyze the differences of means between (1) the 
territorial nations and the United States, (2) the United Kingdom and the United States, 
and (3) Japan and the United States. The three models, respectfully, are: 
(1) DependantVar = ß0 + ß1BA_Dummy+ ß2Country_Dummy + ß3BA_Dummy*Country_Dummy + et 
(2) DependantVar = ß0 + ß1BA_Dummy+ ß2UKUS_Dummy + ß3BA_Dummy*UKUS_Dummy + et 
(3) DependantVar = ß0 + ß1BA_Dummy+ ß2JUS_Dummy + ß3BA_Dummy*JUS_Dummy + et 
where:  
DependantVar = any of the ten dependent variables tested which include the  
five measures of direct competitiveness (Corporate Compliance Costs, 
Corporate Tax Revenue, ROA, Corporate R&D Expenditures, and 
Market Efficiency Rating) and the five measures of the consequences of 
competitiveness (Dividends Repatriated, FDI, Domiciled Corporations, 
Market Capitalization, and Unemployment Rate); 
ß0 = intercept term; 
BA_Dummy = before and after transition dummy is defined as {0, Period before  
2009} and {1, Period after 2009}; 
Country_Dummy = delineates between the territorial transitionaries and the  
American worldwide system defined as {0, Japan and the UK} and {1, 
USA}; 
UKUS_Dummy = defined as {0, UK} and {1, USA}; 
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JUS_Dummy = defined as {0, Japan} and {1, USA}; 
BA_Dummy*Country_Dummy = interaction term referred to as  
 JUKxUS_Interaction; 
BA_Dummy*UKUS_Dummy = interaction term referred to as  
 UKxUS_Interaction; 
BA_Dummy*JUS_Dummy = interaction term referred to as JxUS_Interaction; 
 and 
et = error term. 
For the purposes of this paper, the three interaction terms constitute the focus of my 
research. In each of the three models, the interaction terms test the paper’s hypotheses. 
Significant interaction terms at the 90% confidence interval translate into a statistically 
significant change in competitiveness following the 2009 transitions to territoriality and 
that this change is greater in amplitude than the change experienced in the United States 
for the same dependent variable of competitiveness for the same time period. 
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V. Results 
This section describes the results and findings of the research and is organized 
into three subsections. The comparison between the two territorial countries and the 
United States is analyzed first followed by an individual assessment of each of the 
territorial countries (the UK and Japan, respectfully) compared against statistics for the 
U.S. The data is organized into three tables. Table 1 contains the raw data for the three 
countries for each indicator of direct competitiveness between the years of 2006-2012. 
Table 2 contains the raw data for each of the five measures of the consequences of 
competitiveness. Table 2 is organized by country and contains data for the years 
between 2006-2012. Table 1 and Table 2 provide the data to produce the difference of 
means statistics found in Table 3 and the multivariate results in Table 4. Table 3 
contains the means for each dependant variable for the two periods (before and after the 
2009 transition to territoriality) for each of the three countries, the difference in means 
between the two time periods for each country, and a comparison of the difference in 
means statistics for each of the territorial nations compared to the U.S. Table 4 presents 
the descriptive statistics for each of the main variables. Most importantly, Table 4 
provides the p-value for each model’s interaction term. The p-value tests whether the 
recorded change in the dependant variable between the time period before transition and 
after transition for the U.K. and Japan is significantly different than the recorded change 
in the U.S. The interaction term is considered to be significant at the 90% confidence 
interval due to the fact that this is a one-sided test. To be significant at the 90% 
confidence interval requires a p-value less than 0.010; this assures that if the tests were 
reexamined the research would have at least a 90% chance of returning the same 
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recorded change. Once the significance test is passed, the coefficient (ß3 in the model 
and title B in Table 4) is used to predict the change in the dependent variable across the 
listed countries and time period. The bulk of this paper’s conclusion references the 
descriptive statistics for the interaction terms (JUKxUS_Interaction, 
UKxUS_Interaction, and JxUS_Interaction) in Table 4. 
Comparison: Territorial Nations and the U.S.  
Table 4 shows that of the ten indicators of competitiveness two are significant at 
a 90% confidence interval across the countries and the time periods. The interaction 
term, JUKxUS_Interaction, is significant at 0.083 for the dependent variable of 
unemployment and at 0.019 for the market efficiency rating. The remaining eight 
indicators are highly insignificant which include: corporate compliance costs, corporate 
tax revenue, ROA, corporate R&D expenditure, dividends repatriated, FDI, domiciled 
corporations, and market capitalization. An insignificant interaction term for these eight 
measures translates into a situation in which although a change was witnessed in the 
territorial nations after their tax regime transition, the recorded change did not 
significantly differ from the change witnessed in the U.S. Thus, insignificant interaction 
terms suggest the tax regime change having no noticeable or significant change in the 
country’s competitiveness.  
Across the three countries, the mean unemployment rate increased and the mean 
market efficiency rating decreased following the 2009 transition. Initially this would 
appear to suggest that territorial taxation reduced the competitiveness of British and 
Japanese firms, however the U.S. witness a similar, more severe reduction in overall 
competitiveness. For the time period between 2010-2012, the United States experienced 
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a 2.3% higher increase in the unemployment rate and a 0.387 larger decrease in the 
market efficiency rating compared to the territorial nations. Whether individually or 
jointly compared to the United States, the interaction for each of these dependent 
variables is significant. Thus, the data indicates that adopting elements of territoriality 
buffered a trend in increased unemployment for Britain and Japan. 
In respect to the measures of unemployment and the market efficiency rating, 
the United States is competitively disadvantaged to a system of territoriality. These 
results raise two concerns. The first concern is the tenuous link between the causation of 
taxation and these two dependant variables. Unemployment is a result of a myriad of 
factors in addition to the country’s taxation system. The market efficiency rating was 
originally included in the model to represent the competitive measure of market share; 
however in addition to the market share, it captures a variety of enterprise-related 
measures. Because these are the only two measures of significance, it cannot be 
concluded with certainty that the worldwide system of taxation competitively 
disadvantages the United States. Furthermore the significance of the unemployment rate 
and the market efficiency rating variables relies on the assumption that there was a 
global trend of decreasing competitiveness overall, but this cannot accurately be 
presumed when only three countries were investigated. 
Comparison: United Kingdom and the U.S. 
Although the results of the regressions that divide the data by taxation regime 
(territorial transitionaries and the American worldwide system) is relatively 
inconclusive, insights can be garnered by analyzing on an individual basis. There is not 
one single model of territoriality; each is customized to the needs of a nation. Therefore, 
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the American worldwide system is independently compared to Britain and Japan’s 
systems of territoriality. 
The interaction term, UKxUS_Interaction, is the focus of the study to determine 
the effect the 2009 transition to territoriality had on Britain’s overall competitiveness. In 
addition to the unemployment rate, the indicator of dividends repatriated is significant. 
For the discussion on the significance of the unemployment rate please see the previous 
section. The remaining variable with significant results, dividends repatriated, suggests 
that the U.S. experienced a decrease in competitiveness in relation to Britain’s transition 
to a territorial taxation system. Table 4 shows the interaction term with the dependant 
variable of dividends repatriated has p-value equal to a value less than 0.001. 
When dividends repatriated is the dependant variable, the coefficient for the 
interaction term, UKxUS_Interaction, is negative and significant. This result affirms 
that dividend repatriations in the U.K. increased more during the time period than the 
United States’ dividend repatriations. Table 4 suggests that when compared against the 
United States, Her Majesty’s Treasury collected 1.5% more dividends than the U.S. in 
the three years following its adoption of territoriality in 2009. Though this figure 
appears inconsequential, one must consider that the figure is expressed as a percentage 
of GDP. If the U.K.’s average GDP is approximated as $2.5 trillion, this result 
translates into an additional $37.5 billion of annual taxable income from dividend 
repatriations.
11
 Furthermore, this result supports the two-test theory in that direct 
measures of competitiveness are reinforced by indicators of the consequences of 
competitiveness. Specifically, an increased repatriation rate translates into a more 
                                                        
11
 $2.5 trillion * 0.015 = $37.5 billion 
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efficient allocation of resources and investments, which then positively stimulates the 
economy and ultimately trickles down to the labor force with increased employment.  
The implications of a more competitive United Kingdom operating under 
territoriality are counterbalanced by the remaining insignificant dependent variables. 
The other eight measures have interaction terms with p-values greater than 0.010, which 
suggests that the majority of the measures of competitiveness and its consequences have 
changes that are no greater or less than the change experienced in the U.S. Thus, these 
eight insignificant indicators suggest no noticeable measure of the change in 
competitiveness was recorded for the U.K. in relation to the U.S. following its 
transition. 
Comparison: Japan and the U.S. 
Referring to Table 4, it can be seen that three interaction terms are significant at 
a 90% confidence interval. The unemployment rate and the market efficiency rating 
have already been discussed in-depth under the section titled, Comparison: Territorial 
Nations and the U.S. The one remaining significant interaction term corresponds to the 
dependant variable of corporate R&D expenditure (p-value equal to 0.056). Japan and 
the United States experienced a decrease in corporate R&D expenditures between the 
time period before and after the 2009 transition. This reduction could be partially due to 
global economic considerations such as the 2009 Financial Crisis, but the United States 
did not witness as steep a reduction as Japan. Thus for the years following 2009, the 
United States spent 0.1% more on corporate R&D than Japan. Increased R&D 
expenditures correlate to increased competitiveness, thus posing a point that disproves 
the paper’s hypothesis. 
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Further disproving the paper’s hypothesis, the interaction term for the variables 
of corporate compliance costs, corporate tax revenue, ROA, dividends repatriated, FDI, 
domiciled corporations, and market capitalization is insignificant. Each insignificant 
variable indicates that the form of competitiveness it measured did not show a 
noticeable difference to the change in the same variable for the United States.  
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VI. Conclusions 
This paper investigates whether the United States’ worldwide system of taxation 
systematically disadvantages its multinational corporations compared to its territorial 
counterparts. The work employs ten indicators of competitiveness that include: 
corporate compliance costs, corporate tax revenue, ROA, corporate R&D expenditures, 
the market efficiency rating, amount of dividends repatriated, FDI, the number of 
domiciled corporations, the market capitalization, the number of domiciled 
corporations, and the unemployment rate. This data is collected for the U.K. and Japan 
who both transitioned to a territorial system of taxation in 2009. This data is then 
compared against similar measures for the United States. Through a difference of means 
approach, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected thus it cannot be definitively proven 
that the worldwide system of taxation competitively disadvantages U.S. MNCs. 
Ultimately the data does not suggest that the United Kingdom and Japan are overall 
more or less competitive due to territorial taxation; however, there is not an 
overwhelming amount of data pointing to the contrary. One takeaway from the 
inconclusive results is the need for additional data, which can only be remedied with 
time. It is possible that their transitions to territoriality are still overcoming short-term 
obstacles to reap long-term benefits. Furthermore, it could be pertinent to investigate the 
success of the British and Japanese transitions to territoriality when compared against 
long-term practitioners of territoriality to uncover what policies specifically increased 
their competitiveness.
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Table 3: Difference of Means for the Main Variables, by Country 
 
(i) 
u1 represents the mean of the territorial 
   nations of Japan and the United Kingdom 
(ii)
 u2 represents the worldwide mean of the 
   United States 
(iii)
 ub represents the mean of the dependent 
    variable between the years of 2006-2008, 
    pre-transition 
(iv)
 ua represents the mean of the dependent 
    variable between the years of 20010-2012, 
    post-transition 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(i)Significance for the one-tailed test is 0.10 
(ii) BA_Dummy is defined as {0, Period before 2009} and {1, Period after 
2009} 
(iii) JUS_Dummy is defined as {0, Japan} and {1, USA} 
(iv) JxUS_Interaction is the interaction term between BA_Dummy and the 
JUS_Dummy 
(v) UKUS_Dummy is defined as {0, UK} and {1, USA} 
(vi) UKxUS_Interaction is the interaction term between BA_Dummy and the 
UKUS_Dummy 
(vii) Country_Dummy is defined as {0, Japan and the UK} and {1, USA} 
(viii) JUKxUS Interaction is the interaction term between BA_Dummy and 
the Country_Dummy 
